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United States Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Counterintelligence... Practice it... Live it

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

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

Counterintelligence . . . What Is It?

While much of foreign intelligence consists of information openly obtained from public sources, a small but vital portion must be collected through sensitive sources and methods. Several methods are used to meet that need—including eavesdropping by technical means and recruiting individuals to provide protected information. The U.S. foreign affairs community is a high-priority target for both technical and human resource penetration by the U.S.S.R. and its allies.

A comprehensive counterintelligence program is designed to deny hostile intelligence services information about sensitive government policies, programs, and capabilities. Let us first dispel the misconception that counterintelligence is primarily double-agent activities a là John LeCarré novels. Most elements of a counterintelligence program are simple, commonsense activities. Some basic components of a counterintelligence program include the following:

- **Background investigations** to weed out those individuals whose loyalty to the United States is in question, or whose character flaws are of sufficient severity to

make them vulnerable to exploitation by hostile intelligence.

- **Special screening** of all employees destined for assignments in countries with an active hostile intelligence effort.

- **Special briefings** in Washington and at post for those being assigned to Communistcontrolled countries.

- **Technical programs** to deny hostile intelligence the opportunity to electronically penetrate chanceries overseas.

- **Requirements for reporting significant contacts** with citizens of Communist-controlled countries, and obtaining advance approval and briefing if traveling to Communist-controlled countries for nonbusiness purposes.

- **A debriefing program** for those reassigned from Communist-controlled countries.

- **The voluntary reporting** by individuals who have observed activity that they believe endangers the national security of the United States.



Hostile Intelligence

Hostile intelligence services perform both defensive and offensive activities. The goal of their defensive activities (counterintelligence) is to deter, detect, and/or neutralize the intelligence efforts of other foreign powers. Offensive activities are designed to collect information about the strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and probable courses of action of other foreign powers, particularly those they consider "the enemy." They may include actions to politically, economically, and socially destabilize another country. The highest priority is attached to the recruitment of U.S. Government employees.

U.S.S.R. authorities and allies attempt to regulate virtually all aspects of a foreigner's visit to, and stay in, their country. Through a combination of administrative and bureaucratic controls they are able to determine who may visit their country and for what reasons; when and how often such visits may occur; with whom foreigners may associate; where visitors may reside during their stay; and how and where they may travel while they are in the country.

Communist-country security authorities are, therefore, especially concerned about

two possible dangers posed by foreign visitors:

- Any foreigner is a potential spy—especially if that person is an American; and

- Contamination of their political and economic systems by foreigners who have uncontrolled contact with their citizens.

Once they have satisfied themselves that you pose no immediate danger to the state (that is, you are not engaged in intelligence activities against them), they will explore ways to exploit you to their advantage. It is to counter that threat that this booklet is prepared.



What Makes You a Target

All government employees traveling to or residing in the U.S.S.R. or other Communist-controlled country should be conscious of the fact that they are specific targets of intelligence interest. The extent of that interest may be shaped somewhat by the nature of their assignment (that is, military attaches and political and intelligence officers would be of more interest than the commissary manager). Security services examine foreign visitors and residents from two perspectives: first, what is the likelihood that the individual is engaged in intelligence activities against the state; and second, does that individual possess some value that would make him or her worth recruiting?

You can expect, therefore, to be under some scrutiny while in a Communist country. That scrutiny may not be apparent. A surveillance team may not walk up your heels. It nonetheless will be there—from the hotel personnel who report on you and your activities when you are traveling within country, to the intelligence personnel placed in positions in the business and government infrastructure, to the use by the country's intelligence service of its tourist organization. The degree of sophistication and intensity of coverage

will vary from country to country, with the U.S.S.R. and its satellites being the most active and skilled in intelligence activities against foreigners.

The best example of an aggressive hostile intelligence organization is that of the U.S.S.R.'s Committee for State Security (**K**omitet **G**osudarstvennoy **B**ezopasnosti (KGB)), which is charged with the protection of the Soviet state from all foreign enemies. Working from a worst-case scenario, the Second Chief Directorate (Counterintelligence) of the KGB routinely considers all American diplomatic and staff personnel as potential intelligence agents. Aside from the general suspicion of possibly being a spy for the "main enemy," visitors from the United States and U.S. Embassy staff attract greater attention from Soviet authorities if they fall into any of the following categories:

- Speak the language fluently;
- Have Russian surnames;
- Travel frequently to the U.S.S.R.;
- Have studied in the U.S.S.R.;
- Make social or intimate friends with Soviet citizens;
- Work in support services with access to sensitive or classified information (for example, administrative personnel, contractors, Marine Security Guards, Seabees, communicators, etc.)
- Make contact with certain classes of Soviet citizens, such as dissidents and refuseniks (those refused permission to emigrate from the

U.S.S.R.), or religious leaders and organizations such as the Russian Baptists or Russian Pentecostals;

- Attempt to proselytize their religious beliefs or distribute religious or political pamphlets and publications;
- Attempt to gather information or material of a controversial nature for the purpose of writing an exposé;
- Work in a speciality, the product of which is on the import restricted list;
- Have relatives in the U.S.S.R.;
- Have a fiancé in the U.S.S.R.;
- Work in positions in government that involve foreign policy, intelligence, counterintelligence, or any sensitive area concerning national security or defense;
- Have a family member meeting the above criteria;
- Express opinions sympathetic to that of the Soviets, or violent dissatisfaction with the United States; and/or
- Express violent anti-Soviet sentiments.

The same "flags" apply to the intelligence services of other Communist countries.

Note that the Soviet intelligence services are active against Americans around the world, and not just while they are assigned to the U.S.S.R. Indeed, some of the most aggressive targeting actions against Americans by the Soviets occur outside the United States and the U.S.S.R.



The Hostile Intelligence Recruitment Process

Hostile intelligence services have used a variety of methods to entice, entrap, or coerce foreigners to provide information of intelligence value to them. The majority of developmental operations (that is, intelligence operations that are designed to assess and test a target individual prior to making the actual recruitment approach) and recruitment attempts have been based on some type of coercion.

An intelligence recruitment attempt does not happen spontaneously. In most instances considerable planning and work has gone into the act. For the purpose of this overview, think of the recruitment process as consisting of the following stages:

Spotting. Intelligence operatives and/or their agents look about for individuals fitting one or more of the categories noted on pages 6 and 7, or who have character flaws that could be exploited. This information is reported back through channels and decisions are made whether to pursue an individual and what tactics to use.

Vetting. Individuals selected for intelligence exploitation are subjected to

investigation/testing to learn more about them, their strengths and weaknesses, their pressure points, reliability, and whether they are what they appear to be. This vetting process continues throughout an intelligence operation, even after an individual has been recruited and is working for hostile intelligence. There will always be tests to check the reliability of the agent.

Development. Any action or series of actions that prepare, soften, or set up the target for the actual recruitment attempt.

Recruitment. That moment when an intelligence officer asks the target to work for the hostile intelligence agency and when the espionage pact is signed.

Training. Following the formal recruitment, training provided to the recruited agent in the various "tradescraft" associated with his or her intelligence mission. This might include how to communicate clandestinely, how to use special photographic equipment, etc.

Tasking. The agent is given his or her assignment.

The most common recruitment attempts have used one or more of the following motivational tactics:

Fear. This takes such forms as fear of exposure (blackmail) of criminal acts and/or sexual indiscretions, threats of violence or reprisals against family members resident in the country, threats to deny visa or work opportunities, and threats of imprisonment because of illegal use of narcotics, black market activities, possession of pornographic material,

prostitution, etc. By far the greatest number of recruitment attempts have been based on exploitation of fear.

Greed. Evidenced by always wanting more money and possessions than you now have. The Soviets believe this to be the most effective lever in recruiting Americans, whom they regard as willing to do anything for money.

Need. The existence of financial need resulting from medical problems, indebtedness, extravagant lifestyle, etc.

National Pride. Appealing to national pride or love of the motherland for persons with ancestral roots (and relatives) in the country.

Thrills. A rare few have apparently entered into clandestine intelligence relationships with the U.S.S.R. for the thrills and element of danger involved.

Naivete. The exploitation of naivete has often been attempted against scientists and academics. An apparently innocent (and ego-rewarding) interest in the American's work and writings leads to requests to do innocuous translations and write papers. The taskings eventually begin to focus on sensitive information. When the target demurs, he is told that there is evidentce that he is already working for the hostile intelligence service (they previously insisted that he be compensated for his innocuous work) and if he does not help them he will be exposed as a spy, leading to loss of his job, prosecution by his country, etc.

Revenge. Some individuals can be recruited on the basis of their desire for revenge against their country or employer. The Soviet intelligence service is always looking for the individual with real or imagined grievances who might be persuaded to sell or even give away government or business secrets just to "get even."

False Flag. In some instances, hostile-intelligence services have approached Westerners posing as non-Communists and attempted to recruit them by developing their friendship and asking them to provide information, the giving of which might not be questionable if the person indeed were a citizen of a non-Communist state. Intelligence officers have posed as Scandinavians, Israelis, West Germans, Dutch, Canadians, etc. This tactic, which is called the "false flag approach," is designed to misdirect attention.

Emotional Involvement. A recruitment tactic used frequently over the years is that of causing the Westerner to become emotionally involved with someone from the U.S.S.R. Love has caused many to betray their country in order to "obtain a visa" for their spouse or lover to leave the U.S.S.R., East Germany, etc., or to spare their love object from the threat of being imprisoned if they do not cooperate.

As noted, blackmail is often used to obtain the cooperation of an intelligence target. Some areas of common blackmail exploitation are as follows:

- Sexual indiscretions
- Black market activities

- Currency exchange
- Illegal activities (under laws of target's country)
- Drug use/smuggling
- Sexual crimes (rape, spreading venereal disease)

Members of hostile intelligence services are expert at placing well-intentioned foreigners in positions where they can be coerced into acting against the interests of their country or their firms. Take care to avoid compromising situations that could place you at risk of embarrassment, blackmail, fine, deportation, or arrest.

Even though the vast majority of Soviet citizens are not members of the Communist Party and a large segment of the population, if not openly hostile to the authorities, is certainly apolitical and apathetic, the average Soviet will immediately report to the authorities unusual or suspicious activity on the part of foreigners. This is in addition to the fact that Soviets are required to report all contacts with foreigners to the KGB. Needless to say, there are always exceptions and more and more Soviets seem to be willing to risk the ire of their government by initiating casual contact with visitors to their country.

Citizens of other Communist countries are for the most part under less control and meet foreigners with greater ease. They are, nonetheless, under scrutiny by their security organizations, which ensure that such contacts do not go unnoticed or unexploited.



Recruitment Attempts

Travelers to Communist countries should assume that they are potential objects for recruitment attempts by the host country's intelligence service. If you believe you are the actual object of an intelligence recruitment attempt, contact the U.S. Embassy security officer.

Individuals from the following professions and organizations should consider themselves prime targets for recruitment:

- U.S. Government, particularly Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce
- High-technology firms or defense contractors
- Politicians or political aids
- Graduate or undergraduate language students
- Translators with trade shows or other missions

The following examples are a sampling of tactics that have been used to successfully recruit or entrap individuals:

- The **honey trap**. This is usually used against married individuals or homosexuals who wish their sexual

activities to remain unknown. You meet a woman or man who ends up in your hotel room. At times, drugs have been surreptitiously administered to the target (usually in a drink) to get him or her in a more willing mood. Of course compromising pictures are usually taken. There are variations to this trap. For example, you are a male political officer and you meet a woman who ends up in your hotel room. She starts screaming when you are undressed. Police are conveniently nearby and immediately arrest you on rape and assault charges. You now face either punishment at the hands of the law or threatened exposure to your employer and family unless you cooperate with the intelligence service that has engineered the trap.

- You are offered a "**great currency deal**." Unfortunately, you are arrested in the act and face a long prison sentence or threatened with exposure to your employer who prohibits black-market currency speculation. However, if you would only cooperate, an arrangement could be made . . . .

- You have a liaison with a man or woman only to find that you have contracted a **venereal disease**. A friend offers to get you into a confidential clinic for treatment. Once there all you have to do is sign a release form . . . . Of course, you are later blackmailed by the intelligence service that barters your cooperation for not exposing your indiscretion.

- You meet or are introduced to a man or woman at a party, in the classroom, in a church, or at a museum. You start talking and find you have many **shared interests**. Over time you both cultivate the relationship and begin confiding in each other. The

person begins to ask seemingly innocuous questions about your work and coworkers that gradually become more specific and more technical. By this time however, you are friends and you chalk it up to simple curiousity about your work. What's the harm of telling him or her? After all, you are good friends. An especially effective variation on this is when the agent seems to share a particular technical interest in a subject with you and shares what appears to be inside information with you. He or she may then want you to provide inside information in kind. The sensitivity of the information desired gradually increases, until you have gone too far.

- You are known to be **sympathetic to a certain cause or a particular country**. You are approached by alleged agents of that country (often an ally or friend of the United States), and told they could really use certain information. You are told that if you gave it to them you would not really be hurting your country—"after all we are allies"—and you would be helping the other country that you like so much. You provide the information, small unclassified requests at first but gradually becoming more sensitive. What you don't know is that the agents do not work for the country they have indicated, but rather for a hostile intelligence service. They even-tually will confront you with that fact and demand that you provide sensitive information.

You should know that each situation described above is often sweetened over time by the **payment of money**, for which receipts are always demanded ("my boss doesn't trust me . . . he thinks that I am stealing the money"), and later become part

of the "evidence of active cooperation" that is used to force you into a clandestine relationship. Never listen to the argument from a foreign intelligence agent that compromising proprietary company data/ products or unclassified government data is not really spying on your country.

If any of the above occur to you, realize that once trapped, regardless of what you are told, they will **NEVER** stop using you. Do not delude yourself into thinking you can somehow outsmart them or free yourself from them on your own.

How To Practice Counterintelligence

Avoid any actions or activities that are illegal, improper, or indiscrete.

Guard your conversation, and keep sensitive papers in your custody at all times. Take it for granted that you are under surveillance by both technical and physical means, including:

- Communications monitoring (telephone, telegram, telex, and mail)
- Photography
- Search
- Surveillance
- Eavesdropping in hotels, offices, and apartments

Do not discuss sensitive matters:

- On the telephone
- In your room
- In a car, particularly in front of an assigned driver

Do not leave sensitive personal or business papers:

- In your room
- In the hotel safe
- In a locked suitcase or briefcase
- In unattended cars, offices, trains, or planes
- Open to photography from the ceiling
- In wastebaskets as drafts or doodles

Do not try to defeat surveillance by trying to slip away from followers or by trying to locate "bugs" in your room. These actions will only generate more interest in you.

Avoid offers of sexual companionship. They may lead to a room raid, photography, and blackmail. Prostitutes report to the secret police. Others may be employed by the intelligence service.

Be suspicious of casual acquaintances and quick friendships with local citizens in the U.S.S.R. or Eastern bloc countries. In those countries, people tend to stay away from foreigners and do not readily or easily make contact. Many who actively seek out friendships with Americans do so as a result of their government's orders.

In your personal conduct, follow these guidelines:

- Do not attempt to keep up with your hosts in social drinking.
- Do not engage in black market activity for money or goods of any kind.

- Do not sell your possessions.
- Do not bring in or purchase illegal drugs.
- Do not bring in pornography.
- Do not bring in religious literature for distribution. (You may bring one Bible for your personal use).
- Do not seek out religious dissidents.
- Do not take ashtrays, towels, menus, glasses, or other mementos from hotels or restaurants.
- Do not accept packages, letters, etc., from local citizens for delivery to the West.
- Do not make political comments or engage in political activity.
- Do not be lured into clandestine meetings with would-be defectors.

Be careful about taking pictures. In some countries it is unwise to take photographs of scenes that could be used to make unfavorable comparisons between the Eastern and Western standards of living. The following picture subjects are clearly prohibited in most Communist countries:

- Police and military installations and personnel
- Bridges
- Fortifications
- Railroad facilities
- Tunnels
- Elevated trains
- Border areas

- Industrial complexes
- Port complexes
- Airports

Avoid taking photographs from moving buses, trains, or aircraft.



What To Do if You are Detained by Hostile Intelligence

Third World and Communist intelligence and security services detain persons for a wide range of real and imagined wrongs. The best advice of course is to do nothing that would give a hostile intelligence service the least reason to pick you up.

If you are arrested or detained by hostile intelligence, however, remember the following:

Always ask to contact the U.S. Embassy. You are entitled to do so under international diplomatic and consular agreements, to which most countries are signatories.

Phrase your request appropriately. Your request is more likely to succeed in a European Communist country if you present it as a demand. In Third World countries, however, making demands could lead to physical abuse.

Do not admit to wrongdoing or sign anything. Part of the detention ritual in Communist countries is a written report you will be asked or told to sign. Decline to

do so, and continue demanding to contact the embassy or consulate.

Do not agree to "help" the hostile service. The hostile service may offer you the opportunity to "help" them in return for releasing you, foregoing prosecution, or not informing your employer or spouse of your indiscretion. If they will not take a simple "no," delay a firm commitment by saying that you have to think it over.

Report to the embassy or consulate security officer immediately. Depending on the circumstances and your status, the embassy or consulate may have to provide you assistance in departing the country expeditiously.

Report to your agency's security officer and the FBI upon returning to the United States. This is especially important if you were unable to report to the embassy or consulate in country. Remember, *you will not be able to outwit a hostile intelligence service. Do not compound your error by betraying your country.*

END

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